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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880186-CA 
v. t 
DARRELL LAWRENCE WESSENDORF, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of manslaughter in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-205 (Supp. 1987) following a 
trial to the bench in Fifth District Court, in and for Washington 
County, the Honorable J. Phillip Eves# Judge, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 
1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the evidence established that defendant was 
reckless in holding the snake in such proximity to the victim as 
to allow it to strike, and is thus guilty of manslaughter. 
2. Whether the defendant should be excused from 
responsibility in the homicide as the result of the medical 
treatment provided to the victim in an effort to save her life. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Darrell Lawrence Wessendorf, was charged 
with murder in the second degree in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1987). He was convicted, following a bench 
trial, of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, a second 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-205 (Supp. 
1987). He was sentenced to a term of not less than one nor more 
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison; he was also ordered 
to pay $922 in restitution for the funeral expenses of Stevie 
Kirkwood. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morning of May 7, 1987, Willis Kelton picked up 
defendant at the home of Jeri Ann and Marshall Kirkwood in 
LaVerkin, Utah, where defendant rented an upstairs room (T. 17, 
381). Kelton and defendant then traveled toward Cedar City to 
pay an open container ticket when defendant spotted a great basin 
rattlesnake coiled up beside the road (T. 20, 289, 388-89). At 
defendant's request, Kelton pulled over to the side of the road, 
allowing defendant to capture the snake (T. 289, 389). Using a 
jackhandle retrieved from Kelton's truck, defendant put pressure 
on the snake's head and, after a short struggle, imprisoned the 
snake in a plastic gunnysack (T. 289, 389). 
Kelton and defendant then returned to the Kirkwood home 
where defendant tied the sack containing the snake in a tree on 
the east side of the house (T. 390). Defendant asked Ms. 
Kirkwood, who had been observing defendant from the doorway of 
her home, to move the sack to the other side of the tree if the 
sun began to beat down on it (T. 19, 306, 390)• Ms. Kirkwood 
refused to even touch the sack and strongly suggested defendant 
tie it to a tree on the south wide of the house (T. 19, 306, 
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390). After moving the snake, as requested by Ms. Kirkwood, 
defendant and Kelton left for Cedar City a second time that 
morning, somewhere between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m. (T. 391). Not 
lohg after defendant and Kelton departed, Ms. Kirkwood left with 
her daughter, Stevie, and a friend to spend a few hours in St. 
George (T. 21, 395). 
Upon arriving in Cedar City, defendant and Kelton took 
care of their business at the police station and then stayed 
around to "drag main" a couple of times (T. 391). On their way 
out of town, defendant and Kelton stopped at the liquor store to 
purchase a bottle of tequila (T. 392, 394). Defendant and Kelton 
proceeded to share the bottle on their return to LaVerkin (T. 
392). 
When defendant arrived back at the Kirkwood home, he 
released the snake (T. 310-311, 390). The snake was about forty-
two inches long; James LeRoy Glen, a research serpentologist with 
the Veterans Administration Hospital, has "seen probably more 
great basin rattlesnakes than anybody today that's alive," and 
the largest one he has seen was forty-six inches (T. 486). The 
snake tried to crawl off a few times and coiled up every time it 
was approached by dogs running loose in the yard (T. 310-311). 
As a result, defendant mostly sat with the snake coiled up 
underneath his leg away from the dogs (T. 311, 394). Sitting out 
under the shade tree, defendant and Kelton finished off the 
bottle of tequila and waited for Ms. Kirkwood's return (T. 291, 
394). 
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Ms. Kirkwood returned home about 3:00 p.m. and was 
confronted by defendant holding the snake with it hanging around 
his neck and moving around his body (T. 21, 43, 395). Defendant 
proceeded to tease Ms. Kirkwood in an attempt to get her to touch 
or hold the snake. Defendant persisted in this conduct even 
after it became apparent that Ms. Kirkwood was frightened by the 
snake (T. 21-22, 97-98, 291, 314-315, 395, 431). 
In addition to Ms. Kirkwood, defendant approached 
several friends and neighbors of Ms. Kirkwood, as well as 
children just returning home from school (T. 23-26, 291-92, 313-
314, 395-99). Concerned by defendant's conduct, Ms. Kirkwood 
ordered her six year old son, Lyle, who had just returned home 
from school, to go to a neighbor's house for safety (T. 23, 46, 
292, 396, 431). Stevie, Ms. Kirkwood's 2-year-old daughter, was 
told to go to her bedroom and play where she would be out of 
sight of defendant (T. 47). 
Ms. Kirkwood then walked across the street to the 
Church residence (T. 25, 430). Defendant followed with the snake 
draped across his neck (T. 98). Walter Church warned defendant 
that the snake was dangerous and that Hit could bite and kill 
someone" (T. 26, 83). Defendant disregarded this warning and 
told Mr. Church not to worry about it (T. 397-98). Allowing the 
snake to crawl loose around his neck, defendant performed antics 
with the snake for on-lookers who came along (T. 313, 398-99). 
Later, when most everyone had gone, defendant took the 
snake into the Kirkwood home over the objections of Ms. Kirkwood 
(T. 28, 295, 399-401). Defendant stood in the doorway of the 
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Kirkwood home with the snake draped across his shoulders, 
preventing Ms. Kirkwood access to the house unless she consented 
to touch or hold the snake (T. 28, 295, 332). Because of her 
concern for Stevie, Ms. Kirkwood ran around the house and climbed 
through her bedroom window (T. 28-29, 295). 
With the snake still draped across his shoulders, 
defendant entered the Kirkwood home through the front entrance 
and proceeded to the bathroom where Stevie was playing with a 
kitten (T. 29, 295, 401-02, 429, 562). While Stevie was still 
holding the kitten in her right hand, defendant took her left 
hand and stroked the snake with it (T. 402). Stepping around 
behind Stevie, defendant next draped the tail of the snake over 
Stevie's left shoulder and the main body over Stevie's left arm 
and hand (T. 402). Stevie screamed and tried to get away from 
defendant (T. 296, 320). Defendant attempted to take the kitten 
away from Stevie so that he could place both of her hands on the 
snake and have Stevie kiss the snake (T. 369-70, 403, 426, 566-
67). Defendant stuck the snake in her face and at times held the 
snake's head within four inches of Stevie's face (T. 295, 321, 
565). 
Meanwhile, Ms. Kirkwood had obtained a gun from her 
bedroom and had started toward the bathroom (T. 29). Upon seeing 
the snake draped across Stevie, Ms. Kirkwood ordered defendant to 
remove the snake immediately (T. 29, 35, 403-04, 430, 567). 
Defendant ignored Ms. Kirkwood and continued to allow the snake 
to stay on Stevie's shoulder. Ms. Kirkwood demanded that 
defendant remove the snake a second and third time (T. 35, 57). 
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Finally, defendant turned to look at Ms. Kirkwood and felt the 
snake "hunker up" in his hand (T. 404, 565-66). By the time 
defendant focused his attention back on Stevie, the snake had 
attached to her neck (T. 30, 322, 336, 404-05, 565-66). At that 
moment, defendant's hand was at least four to five inches from 
the snake's head (T. 565). 
After realizing that Stevie had been bitten, defendant 
peeled the snake's fangs out of her shoulder (T. 30, 366, 405). 
After dropping the gun in the hallway, Ms. Kirkwood attempted to 
retrieve her daughter, but defendant slammed shut the bathroom 
door (T. 30, 405). Defendant lacerated Stevie's shoulder and 
attempted to suck the snake venom from the wound (T. 405, 563). 
Ms. Kirkwood immediately called the police and then went outside 
and shot the snake (T. 30, 60, 407-08). Upon hearing the shot, 
defendant emerged from the house carrying Stevie (T. 31). Ms. 
Kirkwood managed to free Stevie from defendant's grasp and placed 
her in the car in preparation for the drive to the hospital (T. 
31). A scuffle developed between defendant and Kelton which 
considerably delayed Ms. Kirkwood's departure (T. 31-33, 66, 
410). Ms. Kirkwood needed someone to assist her in getting to 
the hospital and asked Kelton to go with her (T. 31, 67). 
However, defendant attacked Kelton in an effort to prevent him 
from going to the hospital with Ms. Kirkwood (T. 31, 67-68, 412-
13). When Ms. Kirkwood attempted to assist Kelton, defendant 
shoved her to the ground (T. 31, 68, 413). Officer Drolc arrived 
in time to witness defendant's treatment of Ms. Kirkwood (T. 31-
32). Defendant backed off, allowing Ms. Kirkwood and Kelton to 
leave with Stevie for the hospital (T. 32). 
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Upon Stevie's arrival in the emergency room, she was 
treated by four physicians (T. 193). The doctors began the 
administration of antivenin through an intravenous line; three 
vials were put into the IV solution (T. 107-08). Stevie showed 
clinical signs of improvement, but then suddenly, prior to the 
completion of the administration of the antivenin, suffered 
respiratory and cardiac arrest. Despite vigorous efforts to save 
her life, Stevie Kirkwood died (T. 108, 195). 
Dr. Edwin Sweeney, Utah State Medical Examiner, 
conducted an autopsy and determined that the cause of death was 
venomous snakebite (T. 160). 
Defendant claimed at trial that if rattlesnakes are 
"properly handled and [not] startled, that they're perfectly 
harmless" (T. 387). However, defendant admitted that he knew the 
snake was poisonous and that it could bite (T. 428). He 
intentionally took the snake into the bathroom where Stevie was 
playing with kittens and draped the snake across her shoulder (T. 
428-29). 
Defendant was aware that if the snake were startled, it 
could strike (T. 434). He knew the snake had previously reacted 
to animals; in fact, it had reacted to his dog, causing defendant 
to "flip [the snake] in the head" (T. 434). Regardless, he 
exposed the snake to Stevie while she was handling the kittens. 
Defendant also claimed that he has never heard of 
anyone dying from a rattlesnake bite (T. 436). He believed, 
however, that a rattlesnake bite was like a "concentrated" bee 
sting, and he had heard of people dying from bee stings (T. 436). 
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Following the presentation of the evidence, the court 
found defendant not guilty of second degree murder and found him 
guilty of the crime of manslaughter (R. 260). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk in exposing the poisonous rattlesnake to the 21-month old 
victim, Stevie Kirkwood, in this case. Defendant disregarded the 
risk when he draped the snake over Stevie's shoulder and stuck 
the snake within four inches of her face. Defendant knew the 
snake was poisonous and in fact had been warned earlier that day 
to get rid of the snake because it could kill someone. Even when 
viewed from defendant's stand point, an ordinary person would not 
have failed to have perceived the risk. Defendant's conduct 
meets the standard of recklessness and he is, therefore, guilty 
of manslaughter. 
The cause of the child victim's death was rattlesnake 
envenomation. The snake bit Stevie as the direct result of 
defendant's conduct. Stevie was taken to the hospital for 
treatment, but despite medical care from four physicians and a 
host of supporting personnel, Stevie Kirkwood died. Even if 
there were intervening medical error, the error was not a defense 
to defendant because he inflicted a mortal wound on Stevie 
Kirkwood. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
DEFENDANT RECKLESSLY CAUSED THE DEATH OF 
STEVIE KIRKWOOD AND IS GUILTY OF 
MANSLAUGHTER. 
Defendant first claims that the death of Stevie 
Kirkwood was an accident for which he is not criminally 
responsible. In the alternative, he contends that his conduct, 
at most, constituted criminal negligence, and that he was 
improperly convicted of manslaughter. 
Defendant's argument that Stevie's death was purely an 
accident for which he should not be held responsible (A.B. at 7) 
is without merit. As set forth in the statement of facts, 
defendant was aware that the rattlesnake was poisonous. He knew 
that it was a wild animal and could strike at any time. He held 
the snake at its midsection within inches of Stevie, despite her 
screams, and the snake bit her. Defendant can hardly seriously 
contend that this series of events was a fortuitous circumstance 
or happening for which there was no human agency. Defendant was 
not engaging in an act which was lawful and lawfully done under a 
reasonable belief that no harm was possible. This incident was, 
simply, not an accident for which defendant has no criminal 
responsibility. 
A person commits manslaughter if he "recklessly causes 
the death of another.- Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-205(1)(a) (Supp. 
1987) • A person commits negligent homicide if "acting with 
criminal negligence, [he] causes the death of another." Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-5-206 (1978). The crimes are a second degree 
felony and class A misdemeanor, respectively. 
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The definitions of the mens rea elements for these 
crimes are set-forth in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103, which states, 
in relevant part, that a person engages in conduct: 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with 
respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
is aware of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the distinction 
between manslaughter and negligent homicide in State v. Dyer, 671 
P.2d 142 (Utah 1983). The Court stated: 
The only difference between reckless and 
criminally negligent conduct is that under 
the former, one perceives a risk and 
consciously disregards it, whereas under the 
latter, one fails to even perceive the risk. 
The risk in both cases must be of such a 
degree that an ordinary person would not 
disregard or fail to recognize it. The 
distinction, then, is merely one of the 
degree of the perception of the risk. 
Id. at 148. See also State v. Boqqess, 655 P.2d 654 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878 (Utah 1979). 
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In State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), the 
Supreme Court found that the defendant had engaged in reckless 
conduct as the result of placing or pulling a cord around the 
victim's neck during sexual intercourse, a consensual act in an 
apparent attempt to heighten sexual response. The defendant 
intended no harm and there was no struggle. The defendant did 
not possess medical knowledge which made him aware that the 
victim's degree of intoxication could hasten her death. The 
Court found that the evidence did not support a conviction for 
second-degree murder but did support a conviction for 
manslaughter. There was "sufficient evidence that the defendant 
was aware of, but consciously disregarded a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that placing and/or pulling a cord around the 
victim's neck would result in her death." Id. at 1219. The Court 
found the conduct to be a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise, even when viewed 
from the defendant's standpoint. 
The issue in this case is the degree to which defendant 
perceived the risk—did he perceive a risk and disregard it, or 
did he fail to even perceive the risk? 
Defendant claims that he simply did not perceive the 
risk, and bases his contention on his conduct in handling the 
snake (AB at 13). Defendant's conduct in handling the snake, 
however, does not establish that he failed to perceive the risk. 
Defendant was aware of the risk; he knew the snake was poisonous 
(T. 428), he knew the snake could strike at any time (T. 434), 
and he knew that people react differently to envenomation. (T. 
11-
437). Defendant's conduct in handling the snake establishes that 
he knew the risk and that he assumed it—not that he failed to 
perceive a risk. Because defendant was aware of and assumed the 
risk, he was at least reckless in his conduct. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Dyer, "the difference 
[between negligent homicide and manslaughter] lies in making a 
judgment as to where on a continuum of unreasonable conduct one's 
behavior passes from negligence to recklessness." Dyer at 148. 
Additionally, one's "negligence may, in a particular case, 
quickly, even imperceptibly, aggravate on the scale of 
culpability to recklessness. State v. Boggess, 655 P.2d 654 
(Utah 1982)(Stewart, J., concurring) quoting People v. Stanfield, 
36 NY.2d 467, 330 N.E.2d 75, 369 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1975). 
The facts show defendant's conduct was reckless. He 
had been drinking. The evidence is not clear as to precisely how 
much he had to drink, but does establish that defendant and 
Willis Kelton bought a bottle of tequila when they went to Cedar 
City to pay their open container tickets and apparently drank it 
all (T. 394). Defendant's consumption of alcohol likely caused 
him to be less cautious and careful than he may have ordinarily 
have been. However, his consumption of alcohol does not in any 
way minimize or excuse his behavior. Voluntary intoxication is 
not a defense in this case. If Hrecklessness or criminal 
negligence establishes an element of an offense and the actor is 
unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his 
unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1978). See also State v. Royball, 710 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1985); State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985). 
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Ms. Kirkwood testified that after defendant had 
consumed the alcohol, defendant was acting "macho" and had to be 
the "center of attention because he . . . had a deadly animal on 
his shoulder just like Rambo would be packing a machine gun" (T. 
18). It appears from defendant's conduct that trying to be the 
"center of attention" was precisely what he was doing. Over a 
period of more than an hour, defendant performed antics with the 
snake. He chased and taunted Ms. Kirkwood in an attempt to get 
her to hold it—despite her obvious revulsion and fear (T. 21-
22). He performed for the school kids getting off the bus (T. 
313-14, 469). He asked Vaughn Gubler and Allen Shelly if they 
wanted to hold the snake and called then "chicken" when they did 
not (T. 25, 475). It appears that the reaction of the spectators 
only exacerbated defendant's behavior. 
Defendant knew the snake was poisonous (T. 428). He 
also knew the snake could strike if startled (T. 434). He knew 
the venom would cause physical effects; in fact, he carried a 
"snakebite kit" in his truck (T. 406). His awareness is further 
evidenced by the fact that immediately after the snake bit 
Stevie, he lacerated the fang hole in an attempt to extract the 
poison (T. 405, 428). 
Defendant also knew the snake reacted to animals. He 
had the snake near dogs earlier that day, which had caused the 
snake to react (T. 434). Regardless, he took the snake into the 
bathroom where Stevie was playing with kittens (T. 402). This 
conduct further demonstrates defendant's knowledge of and 
disregard of the risk involved. 
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Defendant claims that he has never heard of anyone 
dying from a rattlesnake bite (T. 436). However, he admits that 
he has heard of people dying from bee stings (T. 436). By his 
owh admission, he believes that a rattlesnake bite is like a 
"concentrated" bee sting and a person can become ill (T. 436). 
He also knows that people react differently to bee stings, and 
that some are more severely affected than others (T. 437). Also, 
he admitted to the investigator for the medical examiner, when 
interviewed soon after Stevie's death, that he was aware of the 
deadly poisonous nature of the snake (T. 253, 255). 
Consequently, defendant's attempt to minimize his knowledge 
regarding the deadly nature of rattlesnake venom is not 
persuasive. 
Regardless of defendant's expressed belief concerning 
the deadly nature of the snake, he was informed on the date of 
the crime that the snake could kill. Walter Church, Ms. 
Kirkwood's neighbor from across the street, specifically warned 
defendant that the snake could kill. He told defendant that the 
snake was dangerous and that it could bite and kill someone (T. 
83). He also told defendant that he should "do something about" 
the snake (T. 83). Nevertheless, defendant ignored the warnings 
and continued to engage in his reckless behavior. 
Defendant further claims that because he was bitten by 
a rattlesnake when he was a child of five years and suffered no 
major ill-effects (although he was taken to the hospital), he 
would not have known that this snake was dangerous (A.B. at 23; 
T. 376-77). However, the snake which bit defendant was a 
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sidewinder and was only twelve to eighteen inches long (T. 378). 
Furthermore, he was bitten on the finger (T. 378). The size of 
the snake and the location of the bite are important factors. As 
Mr. Glen, the research serpentologist, explained, the size of the 
snake and the location of the bite are important to survival. If 
a small child gets bitten on the trunk of the body or near the 
neck, the chance of death is increased. The snake in defendant's 
possession was unusually large, measuring about forty-two inches 
(T. 486). There is no question that defendant knew the age and 
size of the child (T. 383). He also knew people react 
differently to envenomation. (T. 437). Regardless, defendant 
draped the snake over Stevie's shoulder, and, as Willis Kelton 
put it, stuck the snake in her face (T. 295, 321). Further, he 
held the snake only by its midsection (T. 254); he did not even 
attempt to exercise control over the snake's ability to strike 
out at Stevie. He also looked away from Stevie, to look at Jeri, 
allowing the snake to strike (T. 404). Defendant's argument that 
he was unaware of the risk is not persuasive when juxtaposed to 
his knowledge and behavior. 
Defendant's expert witness testified that there have 
been six deaths caused by rattle snake envenomation in the State 
of Utah since 1900 (T. 489). The witness' testimony is 
irrelevant to this defendant's state of mind at the time in 
question. Defendant did not have the benefit of these statistics 
when his conduct caused the snake to bite Stevie. Further, 
despite the infrequency of death as the result of rattlesnake 
bites, such deaths do, indeed, occur. The rattlesnake 
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envenomation was unquestionably the cause of death in this case 
(T. 160, 226). Death from different kinds of poison may, indeed, 
be rare. However, it does not change the deadly nature of the 
poison or justify one's needless exposure to the risk. Defendant 
did not have the benefit of his expert's statistics; he did, 
however, have the benefit of knowing that the snake was 
poisonous, that it could strike at any time, and that, as he put 
it, a rattlesnake bite is a concentrated bee sting and even been 
stings can be fatal. 
Additionally, Mr. Glen, was given a hypotethical 
question in which defendant's conduct in this case was presented 
to him. Based on his experience, Mr. Glen testified that 
defendant's conduct created a substantial risk of death (T. 518-
19). 
As the Supreme Court stated in State v. Howard, 597 
P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979), the degree of the defendant's 
perception of the risk and his subjective intent is a question of 
fact to be determined by the trier of fact. See also State v. 
Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983). In this case, the trial court, 
sitting without a jury, determined that defendant did not 
intentionally or with depraved indifference kill Stevie, but he 
was reckless when engaging in the conduct that caused Stevie's 
death (T. 2/24/88 at 6-7). The standard of review of verdicts 
from bench trials is subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard, 
rather than the standard for jury trials in which an appellate 
court will overturn the verdict only when the evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have 
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reached the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472 (Utah 
App. 1987). When examining the trial court's determination that 
the evidence was sufficient to take defendant's conduct on the 
continuum from negligence to recklessness, this Court should find 
the evidence sufficient. Given the sufficiency of the evidence 
on this point, the trial was not "clearly erroneous" in finding 
defendant's conduct met the standard for recklessness. 
While the trial court's choice words may have been, on 
occasion, confusing as the to legal standard he was applying in 
finding defendant guilty of manslaughter, this Court should still 
uphold the verdict. When applying the standard for recklessness, 
it becomes clear that the facts establish the requisite mens rea. 
Even when viewed from defendant's standpoint, an ordinary person 
would not have failed to have perceived the risk. This Court 
need not rely upon the trial court's choice of words in finding 
defendant was reckless and can use any appropriate grounds to 
uphold the verdict. Jones v.State, 602 P.2d 378 (Wyo. 1979). 
The State does not contend that defendant did not care 
for Stevie or Ms. Kirkwood, or that he intended to cause her harm 
or death. However, the facts establish that he was aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
existed. The risk was substantial; the snake was large and 
poisonous and the child was small. Further the risk was 
unjustifiable. Unlike driving a car or climbing a ladder as 
defendant analogizes (AB at 22), defendant's conduct in thrusting 
the snake in Stevie's face had absolutely no utility. The risk 
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was unjustifiable. Defendant's conduct was a gross deviation 
from the standard of care. Even when viewed from the defendant's 
standpoint, an ordinary person would not have failed to perceive 
the risk. 
When applying the standard for a determination of 
recklessness, it becomes clear that, indeed, defendant's conduct 
was, at a minimum, reckless. When viewing the conduct on the 
continuum spoken about the Dyer Court, it becomes clear that the 
risk was more than something that defendant ought to have been 
aware of. He was, indeed, aware of the risk but chose to 
disregard it. 
POINT II 
THE DEATH OF STEVIE KIRKWOOD RESULTED 
PROXIMATELY FROM THE VENOMOUS SNAKEBITE, AND 
THE MEDICAL INTERVENTION DOES NOT EXCUSE 
DEFENDANT FROM HAVING CAUSED STEVIE'S DEATH. 
Defendant contends that the medical treatment Stevie 
Kirkwood received upon her admission to the hospital became an 
intervening cause of her death and that the alleged negligence of 
the treating physicians should constitute a defense to his 
manslaughter conviction. This contention is erroneous and is not 
supported by the record or by controlling case law of this state. 
Furthermore, State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah 1986), 
established that even when there is medical error it is no 
defense to a defendant who had inflicted a mortal wound. 
In Utah, the State has the burden in a homicide case of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of the victim 
resulted proximately from some act or omission of the defendant. 
State v. Bassett, 27 Utah 2d 272, 274, 495 P.2d 318, 319 (1972). 
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If the injury inflicted contributes immediately to the death of 
the victim, the defendant is guilty of homicide. State v. 
Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 185, 603 P.2d 74, 77-78 (1979); Velarde at 
456. 
In this case, the State presented sufficient evidence 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct in 
allowing the poisonous snake to attach to Stevie's neck 
contributed immediately to her death. The medical examiner for 
the State of Utah, Dr. Sweeney, testified that the cause of 
Stevie's death was the venomous snake bite (T. 159-61). In 
addition, defendant's witness Dr. Dart, an attending physician 
for the Arizona State Poison Control Center, also testified that 
Stevie died from the snake bite (T. 218). The uncontroverted 
testimony of these two witnesses demonstrates beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Stevie died as a direct result of venomous snakebite. 
Stevie was treated by four physicians and various other 
medical personnel when she arrived at the hospital (T. 108). The 
doctors exercised their best judgment, given the situation at the 
time and the clinical signs of improvement after administration 
of the antivenin (T. 121, 131). Even according to defendant's 
expert witness, the medical personnel did not do anything to 
cause Stevie's death (T. 222), the slow administration of the 
antivenin was an acceptable medical practice (T. 202-03), and 
that there was no gross negligence (T. 237). 
However, even if this Court should construe the care 
Stevie received at the hospital as a contributing factor to her 
death, defendant remains responsible. "[IIntervening medical 
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error is not a defense to a defendant who has inflicted a mortal 
wound upon another." Velarde at 456. 
Defendant asserts that Velarde is not applicable here 
and attempts to distinguish it from the instant facts on the 
ground that the venomous snake bite should not have been a mortal 
wound. Although the evidence adduced at trial does suggest that 
a rattlesnake bite may not be as fatal as is popularly believed, 
defendant's assertion fails as applied to the particular facts of 
this case. Both Dr. Dart and Dr. Callahan testified regarding 
the increased danger of a snake bite to a small child. 
Defendant's witness, Dr. Dart, stated that he would expect a 
child in the ten to fifteen kilogram range, like Stevie, to be at 
a "substantial risk of death" (T. 255). Similarly, State's 
witness, Dr. Callahan, stated that the smaller the body of the 
victim, the greater the danger of death from envenomization. (T. 
110-11). Additionally, the research serpentologist, James LeRoy 
Glen, testified about the increased risk for children (T. 493). 
Nonetheless, defendant attempts to distinguish Velarde from the 
present facts asserting that the victim in Velarde would have 
died regardless of whether he received medical treatment. 
Defendant asserts that Stevie might have survived with different 
medical treatment and therefore he is not responsible for her 
death. However, in this case, as in Velarde, subsequent medical 
treatment simply failed to preserve the victim's life. The mere 
possibility that different medical treatment might have brought 
about a different result is too uncertain a foundation to support 
defendant'8 contention that the snakebite should not have been a 
mortal wound. 
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Based upon the above, Velarde is dispositive of the 
issue here. The alleged medical error of the treating physicians 
does not constitute a defense for defendant. Once a defendant 
inflicts a mortal wound, he is not entitled to the benefit of 
medical science—even at its most basic level—to reverse the 
chain of events he has set into motion. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have also examined this 
issue, and some have determined that the adequacy of a victim's 
medical care may have some relevance under limited circumstances. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona considered the issue of medical 
malpractice in State v. Sauter, 120 Ariz. 222, 585 P.2d 242 
(1978). 
M
. . . [I]t is the generally recognized 
principle that where a person inflicts upon 
another a wound which is dangerous, that is, 
calculated to endanger or destroy life, it is 
alleged no defense to a charge of homicide 
that the victim's death was contributed to 
by, or immediately resulted from, unskillful 
or improper treatment of the wound or injury 
by the attending physicians or surgeons." 
Id. at 243, quoting People v. Stamps, 8 Ill.App.3d 896, 291 
N.E.2d 274, 279-80 (1972). 
The Sauter court further stated that only if the death 
of the victim is attributable solely to the medical malpractice 
and is not induced at all by the original wound will the 
intervening treatment constitute a defense. Id. at 244 
(citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court of Colorado requires that the 
intervening medical treatment constitute gross negligence before 
it is available as a defense for the defendant. 
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[MJere negligence on the part of the 
attending physician does not constitute a 
defense. . . . [M]ere medical negligence can 
reasonably be foreseen. We hold, however 
that gross negligence is abnormal human 
behavior, would not be reasonably 
foreseeable, and would constitute a defense, 
if, but for that gross negligence, death 
would not have resulted. 
People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316, 319 
(1975)(emphasis added). 
The reasoning set forth in both Sauter and Calvaresi 
suggests that some degree of a doctor's negligence is foreseeable 
and cannot be used by a defendant to exonerate himself on the 
ground that different or more skillful treatment might have 
preserved the victim's life. Only if the doctor's care is 
grossly negligent and is the actual cause of death, is the 
medical treatment a possible defense. 
The State proved all elements of manslaughter beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Defendant has not shown that the care Stevie 
received at the hospital contributed solely to her death or 
constituted gross negligence. The record in this case does not 
support such an argument. 
Dr. Foxley and Dr. Callahan implemented what in their 
judgment seemed the safest course of treatment for the snakebite 
only after careful consideration of several factors, including 
Stevie's size, and the threat of anaphylactic shock from the 
antivenin increases if too much antivenin was administered too 
quickly (T. 105, 240-41). Therefore, three vials of antivenin 
were prepared for initial administration through the intravenous 
line, with the intention of administering additional antivenin as 
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needed (T. 11-17). After this initial dosage, Stevie gradually 
improved in general appearance and quieted down (T. 108). She 
was then transferred from the emergency room to an intensive care 
unit (T. 111-17, 132-33). Shortly thereafter, Stevie suffered 
respiratory arrest (T. 108, 173). 
Defendant also claims that improper intubation was an 
intervening cause of Stevie's death. Michael Kesler, a 
registered nurse anesthetist, was called to the ICU to intubate 
Stevie to guard her airway during the respiratory arrest (T. 
173). Mr. Kesler testified concerning the procedural protocol 
involved in intubating a patient to guard against improper 
placement of the tube. Imediately after intubation occurs, Mr. 
Kesler routinely checks the patient for proper chest movement (T. 
177-78). When he is satisfied with that, Mr. Kesler checks to 
see if the stomach is distended (T. 183). He then listens to 
both sides of the lungs for breath sounds (T. 178, 182-83). In 
addition to these precautions, Mr. Kesler checks the endotracheal 
tube itself for signs of humidification and condensation which 
show that the patient's breathing is normal (T. 183). Mr. Kesler 
routinely performs these safety procedures after he completes an 
intubation and before the tube is taped in place (T. 178, 182-
83). 
Mr. Kesler followed the requisite procedures in this 
case (T. 182-83). Dr. Callahan also checked Stevie to make sure 
the intubation was done correctly (T. 151). Even defendant's 
witness, Dr. Dart, testified that Kesler followed the correct 
procedures and there is no evidence that Kesler improperly 
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intubated Stevie (T. 218-19). The blood gas tests indicated that 
Stevie was in distress (T. 212). However, improper intubation 
was only one possibility, and there could be other explanations 
as well (T. 213). According to Kesler, the blood gas tests were 
a reflection of the horrible condition Stevie was in and were not 
necessarily an indication that the tube had slipped into her 
stomach (T. 179-180). 
Upon reviewing Stevie's care at the hospital, 
defendant's witness, Dr. Dart, testified that the treating 
physicians had done nothing that would have caused Stevie's death 
(T. 222). Dr. Dart further testified that the slow 
administration of the antivenin was an acceptable medical 
practice and that the care of the physicians did not constitute 
gross negligence (T. 202-03, 237). With the benefit of 
hindsight, the treating physicians may have done things 
differently. However, defendant was not entitled to the benefit 
of any medical intervention to stop the chain of events he set 
into motion when he caused the mortal wound. That the physicians 
intervened but did not save Stevie's life does not lesson 
defendant's capability or mitigate his reckless conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Darrell Lawrence Wessendorf, was 
properly convicted of manslaughter. For the foregoing reasons 
and any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State 
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of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
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